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Message-Id: <20150601100713.3985DB2E03F@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Mon,  1 Jun 2015 06:07:13 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: andrea.palazzo@...el.it
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: PHP SoapClient's __call() type confusion through unserialize()

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Hash: SHA1

> SoapClient's __call() method

> https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=69085

Use CVE-2015-4147 for:

  In soap.c:2906

  if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "__default_headers",
      sizeof("__default_headers"), (void **) &tmp)==SUCCESS) {
         HashTable *default_headers = Z_ARRVAL_P(*tmp);

  the Z_ARRVAL_P macro is called on __default_headers assuming that it
  is an array without any actual check about it.



Use CVE-2015-4148 for:

  very similiar issue located in do_soap_call() (called by __call(),
  indeed).

  soap.c:2754, in do_soap_call()

  if (call_uri == NULL) {
     call_uri = Z_STRVAL_PP(uri);
  }

  where uri comes from zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "uri",
  sizeof("uri"), (void *)&uri), line 2748.

  If the "uri" field has been previously unserialized as an int, this
  could still result in an info leak whereas the attacker would be able
  to control a str.val field of a zval.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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