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Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 17:27:28 -0800
From: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE-Request: dpkg handling of 'control' and
 warnings format string vulnerability

On Thu, Nov 06, 2014 at 08:00:33PM -0500, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
> > A format string vulnerability vuln has been found in the latest version
> > of dpkg.
> > https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/dpkg/+bug/1389135

> Use CVE-2014-8625. We're aware of "does not show evidence of allowing
> attackers to cross privilege boundaries" in
> https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/dpkg/+bug/1389135/comments/2 --
> we'll certainly look for any discussion on this list that disputes the
> CVE.

The build recipes in Debian packaging are all-powerful; they run
arbitrary commands and executables with full privileges of the user
building the package.

The maintainer scripts in Debian binary packages are all-powerful;
they run arbitrary commands and executables with root privileges when
packages are installed.

There is no need to resort to format string vulnerabilities in control
files to execute malicious code in an untrusted package. It would be
easier and more reliable to simply put malicious code directly in the
debian/rules file or postinst scripts.

It is not safe to build packages from untrusted sources.
It is not safe to install packages from untrusted sources.

This is why we did not assign a CVE from Ubuntu's CVE pool.

Thanks

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