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Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 09:57:27 +0100
From: Raphael Geissert <geissert@...ian.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "support@...sion.nl" <support@...sion.nl>, Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: CVE request: temporary file issue in Passenger rubygem
Hi,
On 29 January 2014 00:23, Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com> wrote:
> Phusion Passenger creates a "server instance directory" in /tmp during startup,
> which is a temporary directory that Phusion Passenger uses to store working files.
> This directory is deleted after Phusion Passenger exits. For various technical
> reasons, this directory must have a semi-predictable filename. If a local attacker
> can predict this filename, and precreates a symlink with the same filename that
> points to an arbitrary directory with mode 755, owner root and group root, then
> the attacker will succeed in making Phusion Passenger write files and create
> subdirectories inside that target directory.
Ah, nice catch Jakub. Needless to say, this is related to but
different from CVE-2013-4136.
One thing to notice, however, is that there's a race condition between
the stat check introduced in 34b1087870c2.
The following sequence still triggers the bogus behaviour:
<user> mkdir $dir
<phusion> lstat() (getFileTypeNoFollowSymlinks)
<user> rmdir $dir
<user> ln -s /target $dir
<phusion> stat() (from verifyDirectoryPermissions)
...
Cheers,
--
Raphael Geissert - Debian Developer
www.debian.org - get.debian.net
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