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Message-ID: <5155F71E.3050703@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 14:18:38 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>, "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>, James Antill <james.antill@...hat.com>, Zdenek Pavlas <zpavlas@...hat.com> Subject: Re: CVE Request -- yum: Not removing bad metadata and using it in next run -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 03/27/2013 10:25 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote: > Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors, > > A security flaw was found in the way Yum package manager performed > management of repository metadata in certain circumstances (bad > metadata were not removed properly and re-used in subsequent run). > An attacker could inject a specially-crafted Trojan horse file in > the metadata of a remote repository, possibly leading to their > ability to confuse Yum package manager to accept invalid untrusted > metadata as valid by mistake. > > References: [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=910446 > [2] > http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2013-March/099496.html > > [3] http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2013-March/100299.html > [4] https://lwn.net/Articles/540426/ (and search for 'yum: denial > of service' here) > > Relevant upstream patch: [5] > http://yum.baseurl.org/gitweb?p=yum.git;a=commitdiff;h=c148eb10b798270b3d15087433c8efb2a79a69d0 > > This issue was found by James Antill of Red Hat. > > Could you allocate a CVE id for this? Please use CVE-2013-1910 for this issue. > Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat > Security Response Team > > P.S.: For those possibly wondering why [2] and [3] are public > already - it's true this has been fixed some time ago already (but > I wasn't around at that time) and better to request later, than > never. > > Thank you for your understanding, Jan. > - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJRVfcdAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmT0icP/2/mj5ZfbwYNExpYMfcdmJM/ 6CS4HpwFnTGXls81EpKejdZm92YmjCAMV4sKgSa46VCjEKnCoVDz17drd9NrgMc5 YqRbDzCoXI45+wZAGgEP4gjNG9LAuKN1v7Z+9I2Z6nptObmIUDy/d4xlI1ISUelI KtfS4fXZktITn4MI/fMIHZzEoctPYRlhz+yeaAJpLcC9VMoBnfp5Ac8bvYFCj4M6 L7yYB5gED+y44hfxSJc06GSXqCz8YbkNlcPnTcpox1C8C+jj4zyqmFHLOodVcbGI qF3ZkYppLrZ5qzDCHKsBwKFcVsrkVAoT689JD//yg4kQAlU5xxiE6+By21MxEzYI o6dkM2lFM8+23/Hetm99pOZ2hUh12KlM9zFdNVjPZ30uLaGdmB6MbmiGPqWwt81S 6Z+q4dFY/hEKE5CFhGEDU/GWyEB4W3zx/3bpCkIwCkpCfJ/JsxwV07Hx+4g+wYky W+vvVTSzhPtQSGpSEDz2ADIcFOfdUr69AsbtjVgP2W4Gmkd+5AuipmVQui0aZfHP VEmB/SbmgYqGCVU01JAOVkVT8Mh2du4XhNSJp9udivvY8DZioKstrrFtTzJ8W0tZ ua28gwLUEXQwlWks7roag0k6zoIh7bVytsVmmvT0TlQYMK9DcSgLcmCu8aejyjZK 3nKxKHGyJU+M+dfFg/Rc =xgnU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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