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Message-ID: <20130313115415.GB20033@gremlin.ru>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 15:54:15 +0400
From: gremlin@...mlin.ru
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux kernel + devtmpfs automount == insecure /dev/{,u}random mode

On 13-Mar-2013 17:55:07 +0800, Pavel Labushev wrote:

 > http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0012.2/0502.html

Yes, I've found that while investigating the possible impact. Also,
the random.c doesn't use the data directly, but instead hashes it.

But my opinion stays exactly the same: devices should be 0644, and
only trusted random data sources should be used to add entropy to
the pool via add_device_randomness(). For my own needs, I prefer a
$5 hardware RNG (consisting of ATtiny85 and LM393) plugged to USB,
or even several such devices working in parallel.

So, I'll just restrict the access to /dev/{,u}random locally :-)


-- 
Alexey V. Vissarionov aka Gremlin from Kremlin <gremlin ПРИ gremlin ТЧК ru>
GPG key ID: 0xEF3B1FA8, keyserver: hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
GPG key fingerprint: 8832 FE9F A791 F796 8AC9 6E4E 909D AC45 EF3B 1FA8

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