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Message-ID: <4FA1659C.7040702@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 02 May 2012 10:49:32 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: dhcpcd 3.2.3 remote stack overflow
/ denial of service
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On 05/02/2012 10:08 AM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I would like a CVE for following issue:
>
> One of our customers reported a crash of dhcpcd (a DHCP client)
> version 3.2.3 as found in our products.
>
> This was triggered by regular network traffic happening, so
> attackers in the local network could inject such a packet.
>
> The issue is apparently fixed in dhcpcd-4.0.2 (oldest GIT revision
> of dhcpcd I can find), as it features the necessary checks on
> cursory review.
>
>
> Problem is that the "to copyed" size of a packet is decoded from
> the network data and not checked against the maximum size of the
> retrieved packet.
>
> In dhcpcd 3.2.3 it is copied to a fixed size stackbuffer on some
> paths and so overwrites stack.
>
> On our SLE11 product this is caught by -fstack-protector, turning
> this into a remote denial of service (crash).
>
> Place to look for places like this:
>
> bytes = get_udp_data(&pp, packet); if ((size_t)bytes >
> sizeof(*dhcp)) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: packet greater than DHCP size
> from %s", iface->name, inet_ntoa(from)); continue; }
>
> bytes is calculated from packet data and not bounded in
> get_udp_data(). So without the if() check, it would later copy over
> bytes into a fixed buffer in some paths.
>
> Also: bytes = packet.bh_caplen - ETHER_HDR_LEN; if (bytes > len)
> bytes = len; memcpy(data, payload, bytes);
>
> I have pasted the current patch we use against our quite heavily
> patches dhcpcd 3.2.3 on
> https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=760334
>
> Reference: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=760334
>
> Ciao, Marcus
For the record: this is about as perfect as a CVE request gets =)
Please use CVE-2012-2152 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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