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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2011 19:08:38 +0100
From: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@...rz.de>
To: Josh Bressers <bressers@...hat.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
	"Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
	Stefan Fritsch <sf@...itsch.de>, Petr Uzel <petr.uzel@...e.cz>,
	Thomas Biege <thomas@...e.de>, Jan Kalu??a <jkaluza@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- logrotate -- nine issues

Hi,

> > >     8) Issue #8: logrotate: TOCTOU race condition by creation of new
> > >     files (between opening the file and moment, final permissions have
> > >     been applied) [information disclosure]
> > >
> > 
> 
> Let' use CVE-2011-1098 for this.

What about these?:

| However, I think that still #6 (shell injection) and #7 (logrotate
| DoS with strange characters in file names) should be considered
| vulnerabilities in logrotate: It would be reasonable to assume that you
| can use user input that's a valid (slash-less) filename as a (part of a)
| log file name (assuming that the program is running as the same user that
| inspects and rotates the logs, so the log directory being writable by
| the program would not be insecure per-se) without that file name being
| interpreted by a shell or causing logrotate to stop functioning,
| respectively.

Florian

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