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Message-ID: <AANLkTinUdSydhjxvGixDsb=TdNfKDygBpQg8zJ56K2FF@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2011 10:11:19 +0100
From: Pierre Joye <pierre.php@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>,
Helgi Þormar Þorbjörnsson <helgi@....net>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: PEAR Installer 1.9.1 <= - Symlink Attack
hi,
2011/2/28 Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>:
> I'm not familiar with this code or any of the context surrounding this
> fix, but it appears to be an incomplete fix. Checking for existence
> of a symlink and then opening the resource leaves open a window during
> which a legitimate file can be replaced with a symlink.
Not sure it is fixable, or maybe using a lock on the symbolic link
while fetching its target (to be tested to be sure that such locks
cannot be overridden from shell).
> Also, I don't see a reason why a hard link couldn't be used for exploitation
> instead.
Hard link are not detectable (lstat), they are treated like normal files.
Cheers,
--
Pierre
@pierrejoye | http://blog.thepimp.net | http://www.libgd.org
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