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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 19:47:29 -0500
From: Dan Rosenberg <>
To:, Petr Matousek <>
Subject: Re: CVE request: kernel: gdth: integer overflow in ioc_general()

This is not actually a security issue.  See the code:

if (!(buf = gdth_ioctl_alloc(ha, gen.data_len + gen.sense_len,
                                     FALSE, &paddr)))
            return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(buf, arg + sizeof(gdth_ioctl_general),
                           gen.data_len + gen.sense_len)) {

If gen.data_len + gen.sense_len > UINT_MAX, then a small buffer will
be allocated.  But then the copy_from_user() will always fault before
copying any data over because the access_ok() check will fail on sizes
> UINT_MAX.  It's definitely a bug, but not a vulnerability.

On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Petr Matousek <> wrote:
> "gdth_ioctl_alloc() takes the size variable as an int.
> copy_from_user() takes the size variable as an unsigned long.
> gen.data_len and gen.sense_len are unsigned longs.
> On x86_64 longs are 64 bit and ints are 32 bit.
> We could pass in a very large number and the allocation would truncate
> the size to 32 bits and allocate a small buffer.  Then when we do the
> copy_from_user(), it would result in a memory corruption."
> Upstream commit:
> Credit: James E.J. Bottomley
> Reference:
> Thanks,
> --
> Petr Matousek / Red Hat Security Response Team

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