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Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 02:00:03 +0400
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <>
Subject: Re: Minor security flaw with pam_xauth


On Fri, Oct 01, 2010 at 04:02:04PM -0600, Vincent Danen wrote:
> * [2010-09-28 00:17:29 +0400] Solar Designer wrote:
> >On Mon, Sep 27, 2010 at 11:36:13AM -0600, Vincent Danen wrote:
> >>* [2010-09-24 20:48:23 +0400] Solar Designer wrote:
> >>>pam_env and pam_mail accessing the target user's files as root (and thus
> >>>susceptible to attacks by the user) in Linux-PAM below 1.1.2, partially
> >>>fixed in 1.1.2 - no CVE ID mentioned yet
> >>>
> >>>pam_env and pam_mail in Linux-PAM 1.1.2 not switching fsgid (or egid)
> >>>and groups when accessing the target user's files (and thus potentially
> >>>susceptible to attacks by the user) - CVE-2010-3430
> >>>
> >>>pam_env and pam_mail in Linux-PAM 1.1.2 not checking whether the
> >>>setfsuid() calls succeed (no known impact with current Linux kernels,
> >>>but poor practice in general) - CVE-2010-3431
> >>Are there patches available to fully fix these issues?  And are there
> >>patches for 3430 and 3431 yet?
> >
> >This is the same question asked different ways.  We have a patch that
> >we're reviewing internally.  To be made available soon.
> Great, looking forward to seeing them.

The patch that fixes CVE-2010-3430 and CVE-2010-3431 was just made public:;a=commitdiff;h=pam_modutil_priv

Besides that, another two issues have been fixed in pam_xauth after
Linux-PAM 1.1.2 release:

In pam_sm_close_session(), the attempt to unlink cookie file was made
without dropping privileges at all if target uid could not be determined:;a=commitdiff;h=Linux-PAM-1_1_2-3-g05dafc0

In check_acl(), there were no check that the acl file provided by target
user is a regular file:;a=commitdiff;h=Linux-PAM-1_1_2-2-gffe7058


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