Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2010 00:29:16 +0400 From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Minor security flaw with pam_xauth On Mon, Sep 27, 2010 at 11:44:03AM -0600, Vincent Danen wrote: > >* [2010-09-24 20:48:23 +0400] Solar Designer wrote: > >>pam_xauth missing return value checks from setuid() and similar calls, > >>fixed in Linux-PAM 1.1.2 - CVE-2010-3316 > >> > >>pam_env and pam_mail accessing the target user's files as root (and thus > >>susceptible to attacks by the user) in Linux-PAM below 1.1.2, partially > >>fixed in 1.1.2 - no CVE ID mentioned yet > >> > >>pam_env and pam_mail in Linux-PAM 1.1.2 not switching fsgid (or egid) > >>and groups when accessing the target user's files (and thus potentially > >>susceptible to attacks by the user) - CVE-2010-3430 > >> > >>pam_env and pam_mail in Linux-PAM 1.1.2 not checking whether the > >>setfsuid() calls succeed (no known impact with current Linux kernels, > >>but poor practice in general) - CVE-2010-3431 ... > Oh, hang on. Re-read some older messages again trying to grok this and > it looks like these checks were introduced in 1.1.2, so they would _not_ > affect earlier versions if I'm understanding correctly. Older versions were "fully vulnerable". 1.1.2 is "partially vulnerable". > So only 3316 and the second issue without a CVE name affect pre-1.1.2. Yes, in a sense. > So what about previous versions that _don't_ have privilege switching in > pam_env and pam_mail? Would that require yet another CVE or would the > addition of privilege switching be considered an enhancement, not a > security fix? I think it should be considered a security fix. Moreover, of these four issues (if we keep the separation above), the currently-CVE-less is the most serious one. Alexander
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