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Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 16:57:10 +0200
From: Thomas Biege <thomas@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: coley <coley@...re.org>,
 michael@...iarski.com,
 juliano@...ifera.comt,
 thaidn@...ecurity.net
Subject: Re: CVE request: padding oracle attack: ruby on rails 2.3, owasp esapi


grep'ing the Rails code revealed that encrypt() isn't used
for the cookie by default. Upstream also reports that they
are not vulnerable.
Additionally even if encrypt() is used to encrypt data in a cookie
there is also the digest at the end of the cookie string that might
indicate tampering. ("might" b/c it depends on the implementation,
which I didn't look at).

I got no answer from the POET paper authors yet but it can be
that CVE-2010-3299 is invalid.

Cheers
Thomas


Am Dienstag 14 September 2010 21:36:53 schrieb Josh Bressers:
> I've assgiend two. The details are quite vague unfortunately.
> 
> CVE-2010-3299 padding oracle attack: ruby on rails 2.3
> CVE-2010-3300 padding oracle attack: owasp esapi
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> > Hi,
> > the paper [1], about practical padding oracle attacks
> > mentions some programming frameworks as vulnerable (section 5):
> > - Ruby On ails 2.3
> > - OWASP ESAPI
> >
> > I think they both need a CVE-ID. Thanks.
> >
> > Cheers
> > Thomas
> >
> > [1] http://usenix.org/events/woot10/tech/full_papers/Rizzo.pdf
> 

-- 
 Thomas Biege <thomas@...e.de>, SUSE LINUX, Security Support & Auditing
 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nuernberg)
--
  Wer aufhoert besser werden zu wollen, hoert auf gut zu sein.
                            -- Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach

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