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Message-ID: <20090113233207.GA9072@ngolde.de>
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 00:32:07 +0100
From: Nico Golde <oss-security+ml@...lde.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: coley@...re.org
Subject: update on CVE-2008-5718
Hi,
I just did a security update for CVE-2008-5718 and since the
description is not really verbose I thought I'd share what I
found in case anyone else is working on that.
This issue only affects netatalk installations that make use
of a pipe command to handle the print file and also use one
of the available variables in the piped command.
The netatalk documentation documents %F, %U and %J while
there is also %C which is undocumented but visible in the
code (and does the same as %J).
These variables are expanded, %F with the content of %%From:, %J with
%%Title: from the PostScript stream and %U with the user
printing the file.
After the variable expansion (which is done in
pipexlate(lp.c) the specified,expanded command is passed to
popen() without properly escaping it before.
So exploiting this is pretty straight forward if you know
the papd configuration (which is at least world-readable on
Debian) just by for example preparing a ps file including
something like %%Title: $(yourcommand) and print it.
Steve, can you update the CVE id description according to
this information?
Cheers
Nico
P.S. The patch I used can be found on:
http://people.debian.org/~nion/nmu-diff/netatalk-2.0.3-11_2.0.3-11+lenny1.patch
--
Nico Golde - http://www.ngolde.de - nion@...ber.ccc.de - GPG: 0x73647CFF
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