oss-security - Re: Re: CVE Request

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Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2008 11:17:01 +0100
From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
        Raphael Geissert <atomo64+debian@...il.com>
Subject: Re:  Re: CVE Request - roundcubemail

Hello guys,

On Sat, 2008-12-13 at 13:54 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Raphael Geissert:
> 
> > I became aware of some sort of code execution vulnerability one day
> > before that ticket was reported. After reviewing the file I
> > determined that it isn't a vulnerability in roundcube, but in PHP
> > itself; but I'm open to be proved wrong.
> 
> I think this is a documented feature of preg_replace with the "e"
> flag, comparable to what happens when you use string concatenation to
> create SQL statements.

Yes, according to:
http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=35960

the behavior of 'e' modifier in the preg_replace function is
expected and well documented feature:

http://php.net/manual/en/reference.pcre.pattern.modifiers.php

So the problem isn't in PHP itself, the problem is
roundcubemail (and possibly other applications) use it
in wrong/improper/vulnerable way.

--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

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