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Date: Sat, 31 May 2008 08:33:22 +0000 (UTC)
From:  Mike Frysinger <vapier@...too.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject:  Re: OpenSSH key blacklisting

On Sat, 17 May 2008 01:50:00 +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> Thanks for the "bug" reference.  FWIW, the shell script in this comment
> is vulnerable itself, in more than one way:
> 
> 	http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221759#c9
> 
> For example, it lets a user have any other user's or root's
> authorized_keys removed, by replacing .ssh with a symlink to someone
> else's .ssh directory.  It's just bad practice to access users' files as
> root (or as another user); this is difficult to do safely.
> 
> Also, it misses authorized_keys2.

while the issues you raise are certainly valid in the general case, i 
wrote it for use on a constrained system -- users are not allowed login 
nor are they allowed to control any files directly.  it's a gforge 
system, so all keys are managed via a web interface and the ssh backend 
is only for committing to svn/cvs/git repositories.  so in this setup, 
none of the concerns you raise need to be accounted for.  i leave it up 
to others to extend it for their own safe use ;).
-mike

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