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Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 17:23:56 -0400
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Linus Torvalds
 <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
 Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Greg KH
 <greg@...ah.com>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>, LKML
 <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Dave
 Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo
 Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>,
 linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers
 <x86@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Christian Borntraeger
 <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, René Nyffenegger
 <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, "Paul
 E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
 Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
 Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Andy
 Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Thomas
 Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, 
 "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
 <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Linux API
 <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, James Morse
 <james.morse@....com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, 
 Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, Paolo Bonzini
 <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Thomas
 Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov"
 <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address
 limit before returning to user-mode

> overflow into adjacent allocations (fixed by VMAP_STACK).

99% fixed, but it's possible to skip over the guard page without
-fstack-check enabled (plus some edge cases need to be fixed in GCC),
unless VLAs were forbidden in addition to the existing large frame size
warning.

I'm not sure about in-tree code, but Qualcomm had some of these
improperly bounded VLA vulnerabilities in their MSM kernel...

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