[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 19:54:38 +0100
From: "PaX Team" <pageexec@...email.hu>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
CC: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
park jinbum <jinb.park7@...il.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
spender@...ecurity.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization
On 17 Jan 2017 at 17:48, Mark Rutland wrote:
> That being the case, (and given the relevant bug has now been fixed),
> it's not clear to me what the value of this is today. i.e. given the
> general case, is this preventing many leaks?
no idea, i stopped looking at the instrumentation log long ago, but everyone
can enable the debug output (has a very specific comment on it ;) and look at
the results. i keep this plugin around because it costs nothing to maintain
it and the alternative (better) solution doesn't exist yet.
> > i never went into that direction because i think the security goal can
> > be achieved without the performance impact of forced initialization.
>
> Was there a particular technique you had in mind?
sure, i mentioned it in my SSTIC'12 keynote (page 36):
https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/PaXTeam-SSTIC12-keynote-20-years-of-PaX.pdf
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
